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Abstract 
 
We examine the relationship between prices and interest rates for seven advanced 
economies in the period up to 1913, emphasizing the UK. There is a significant long-run 
positive relationship between prices and interest rates for the core commodity standard 
countries. Keynes (1930) labelled this positive relationship the Gibson Paradox. A number of 
theories have been put forward as possible explanations of the Paradox but they do not fit the 
long-run pattern of the relationship. We find that a formal model in the spirit of Wicksell (1907) 
and Keynes (1930) offers an explanation for the paradox: where the need to stabilize the 
banking sector’s reserve ratio, in the presence of an uncertain natural rate, can lead to persistent 
deviations of the market rate of interest from its natural level and consequently long run swings 
in the price level. 
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1 Introduction
The Gibson Paradox is one of the most completely established empirical
facts within the whole eld of quantitative economics.
J. M. Keynes (1930)
It is true that, in various countries and often for long periods of time,
the movements of interest rates and commodity prices have been such as to
suggest that they might be rationally related to one another in some direct
and simple manner the exceptions to this appearance of relationship are so
numerous and so glaring that they cannot be overlooked.
F. R. Macaulay (1938)
The relationship between interest rates and prices, inter alia, lies at
the heart of monetary theory. It is therefore no surprise to discover that
a debate on what came to be known as the Gibson Paradox played an
important role in the development of theories of interest rate determination.
A number of important works in the early part of the twentieth century,
most notably Wicksell (1907), Fisher (1930) and Keynes (1930), noted and
o¤ered explanations for the positive association between the level of interest
rates and of prices. However, as Macaulay (1938) says there has also been
a healthy strain of opinion denying the very existence of the paradox. More
recently another generation of researchers has re-discovered the paradox and
o¤ered another set of explanations: Sargent (1972); Shiller and Siegel (1977);
Benjamin and Kochin (1984); Friedman and Schwartz (1982); and Barsky
and Summers (1988). The long swings in prices were, of course, noted by
non-monetary theorists such as Lewis (1954) who suggested that the long-
run elasticity of labour supply meant that commodity prices returned to a
long run trend. In this paper though we will assess the evidence for this
paradox and recast a old explanation: that of Wicksell who suggested
that the paradox resulted from persistent deviations of the marketrate of
interest from its naturallevel.
Just what is the Gibson Paradox? When Keynes was naming the
Gibson paradox he was still working within the classical paradigm. Within
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a classical framework the natural interest rate is determined by saving
and investment and the price level by the quantity of money. Why
then should there be any relationship between the two? If one considers
equilibrium states, the variables determining saving and investment and
those determining the price level are not connected. The classical dichotomy
rules the roost. In other words, why should interest rates and prices be
associated in any way? Furthermore, under a classical quantity theory we
even might expect monetary expansions and price rises to be associated with
falls in the level of the nominal interest rate whereupon the paradox arises
from the Gibsons observation that interest rates and prices are actually
positively associated.
In many ways the most attractive and simple explanation for the paradox
is Irving Fishers (1930). He suggested that interest rates would rise to
compensate bondholders for the expected devaluation of money over the
holding period of the bond. We would therefore expect to nd a positive
relationship between expected ination and interest rates and to the extent
that prices are positively correlated with expected ination we will nd a
Gibson paradox.1 This explanation is consistent with the classical dichotomy
by allowing the real interest rate to be independent of ination. To a
great extent, intuition suggests that the Fisher explanation is likely to be
a powerful reason for the continuing observation of the Gibson paradox in
the period when ination rates became persistent i.e. at some point in the
period following the nal suspension of the Gold Standard.
1 In the period of at money, the price level was positively correlated with ination
until the disination path adopted by advanced economies following OPEC II. From which
time, of course, the price level and ination, and hence interest rates, have been negatively
correlated. See Muscatelli and Spinelli (1996) for a discussion of this point.
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Figure 1: The UK Price Level and Long Term Interest Rates: 1700-1913
But along with Sargent (1972) we suspect that the existence of the
paradox is unlikely to result from a Fisher-style story in the years prior
to suspension of the Gold Standard in 1914. This is because the pattern of
the association (see Figure 1) is essentially very long run. Sargent (1972)
sums this point up well: it is di¢ cult to accept both Fishers explanation
of the Gibson Paradox and to maintain that the extraordinary long lags in
expectation are rational. In fact, Shiller and Siegel (1977) argue that as it is
always possible to sum up long period changes in the price level to something
that is essentially the price level, and therefore that the Fisher hypothesis
is particularly prone to Type II errors. These points lead us to explore the
relationship solely in the period of zero average ination (prior to 1914) and
to explore as the most likely set of explanations that interest rates and prices
are mutually determined within the context of a simple Wicksellian model
in which the interplay between commercial banksdesired reserve ratios and
deviations between the market and natural rate of interest set up interest
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rate and price dynamics corresponding to a Gibson paradox.2
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the facts relating to
the so-called Gibson Paradox. Section 3 argues that a theory of uctuations
is required to explain the paradox and nds that the early theories of
Wicksell (1907 and also 1898a and 1898b) and Keynes (1930) incorporated
compelling (and testable) explanations for the Paradox. Section 4 constructs
a new series of the reserve ratio and tests the Wicksellian theory in the
frequency domain. Section 5 concludes and o¤ers some pointers to future
work.
2 The Gibson Paradox
2.1 The International Evidence
This section outlines the characteristics of the relationship between the level
of prices and the level of interest rates for seven countries.3 We examine
the association in the commodity standard period leading up to the end of
the Classical Gold Standard in 1914. During the course of the twentieth
century the price level starts to incorporate a permanent ination rate and
hence the nominal interest rate rises to compensate bondholders for this
permanent devaluation in the value of money: a Fisher e¤ect dominates all
other possible explanations for the relationship in levels (see Barsky 1987
on this point).
2See Bordo and Schwartz (1999) for a description of ination averages in the period
prior to 1914.
3Annex 1 outlines the sources of the data.
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Figure 8:   UK (1727-1797)
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Figure 9:   UK (1821-1913)
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Figure 2: Industrialising Country Price Levels and Interest Rates
The time series plots, Figures 1 and 2, suggest, reasonably clearly, that
there appears to be some positive association between interest rates and
the log-level of prices.4 The relationship appears to hold most consistently
throughout the respective samples for the UK, Germany and Sweden:
countries that had almost uninterrupted adherence to commodity standards
for the samples shown.5 Of course, this does not imply necessarily that the
4 In each case the left-hand column corresponds to the nominal interest rates and the
right-hand column to the log of the price level, where the price level is based to 1913=100
for every country.
5The UK had a suspension of gold convertibility over 1797-1821. The German states
had a bimetallic standard until the adoption of gold during unication in 1871: there
are no records of suspensions for the individual pre-unication states. Germany did not
suspend convertibility until 1914. Sweden was continuously on a silver standard from 1834
to the adoption of gold in 1873. See Bordo and Schwartz (1994).
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Gibson phenomenon is one peculiar to commodity standards but it seems
clearer why previous researchers may have thought so.
For the US, the association appears strongest for the period following the
peak in the prices in 1864 to the end of our sample. In France, the association
breaks down most clearly during the rst decade of the nineteenth century
and the rst commodity standard suspensions of 1848-50 rather than the
later one of 1870-78. In Italy, we nd that the association is clearest from
1872 through to some time in the mid-1890s. The Italian authorities had
suspended metallic convertibility in 1866, adopted the gold standard in
1884 and suspended again in 1894. The association would then seem to
correspond most closely to the period leading up and involving gold standard
convertibility. Finally with the Spanish data we observe the pattern of
(money,) interest rates and prices that Tooke (1844) had argued would
support the Thornton-Ricardo view of a classic monetary shock: higher
money, lower interest rates and higher prices. It turns out that the Spanish
authorities had ended gold and silver convertibility in 1883 (the year our
sample starts) and followed loose monetary and scal policies until at least
1905. This simple plot of the long-run annual data would seem to suggest
that there is a Gibsons paradox in the commodity standard period in need
of explanation. For the rest of the paper we will conne our analysis to the
Keynes-Wicksell position on this dataset.
2.2 The UK Experience
We explore in some more detail the relationship in the UK. There are simple
data driven reasons for this, in terms of span and availability of a wide range
of UK macroeconomic data.6 Figures 1 and 3 suggest not only a long run
6But we can also think of the UK as a member of a xed exchange rate zone, with
parities determined by the relative price of gold and silver. UK prices and interest rates
therefore indicate reasonably well the pattern of prices and interest rates in other members
of the implicit xed exchange rate zone. Of course, the cost of shipping commodities meant
that the exchange rate pegs operate with a degree of exibility and the possibility of exit
might lead to temporary deviations from common patterns. But as a rst pass, common
interest rates and prices are likely to be found, particularly over the long run.
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pattern to the positive association between the interest rate on consols (and
other instruments) and the price level, note for example the number of short-
run price cycles without corresponding movements in consol rates, but also
that there were long periods of falling (I), rising (II) and then falling (III)
prices.7 We note the periods of falling prices correspond approximately to
peace-time and the rising prices to wartime: the signicance of which is the
implication for temporary government expenditures, which can be expected
to raise both prices and interest rates (see Barro 1987).8
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Figure 3: Short and Long Term Interest Rates: 1700-1913.
Figure 3 depicts the fall in interest rates after the end of the War of
Spanish Succession (1702-13). The long term interest rate is the yield of
new government long term issues from 1702-1728, old 3% Annuities from
1729-52 and 3% consol rate from 1753. Note that the other interest rates
7The panels in Figure 3 correspond to I, II and III, respectively.
8Wartime in the British eighteenth century comprised 1702-1713; 1740-48; 1756-63;
1775-83; 1793-1815.
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shown are all short-term bills. Short-term government obligations called
Exchequer Bills were issued from 1696, bore xed interest, were assignable
and matured after one year.9 Neither consol rates nor Exchequer bill, as
government obligations were subject to the Usury Laws and are considered a
good indicator of the whole family of rates in the period up to 1833 (Ashton
1959, p87). And Clapham (1944) states that the last remnants of the
Usury Laws were removed in 1854 they had not interfered with anyone
since 1838 nor perceptibly with the Bank since 1833(Volume II. p4). The
Bank of England Bank Rate and the Discount rate on Prime Bills become
increasingly the short-term reference interest rates as the nineteenth century
bears on. And as such we nd that their longer run movements are closely
related to the long-term interest rate.10
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the UK. We nd that the
price level and both short- and long-term interest rates show very similar
time series properties. The third column, the inverse of the coe¢ cient of
variation, is indicative of the (inverse) probability of a turning point in the
data and suggests that there is relatively little important cycling away in
the very lower frequencies of the data.11 We nd signicant evidence of
right-skewness in prices, the consol rate and the exchequer bill rate. Finally,
consistent with column three, the data also suggest signicant leptokurtic
behaviour, which implies a heightened likelihood of (business cycle) changes
around the mean.
Table 2 suggests important correlations contemporaneously and at leads
and lags of up to ve years for prices and each class of interest rates.12 The
9The source here is Parliamentary Papaers 1857-58, XXXIII (443) pp35-39, which gives
annual data from 1696-1857. These securities were the favoured short-term investment
instrument until the 1830s (see Gayer et al, 1953, p1418).
10See Pressnell (1960) for further description of interest rates in this period.
11This is because is we consider a variable following a Wiener process, the probability of
a negative turning point is given by the area under the standard normal. A variable with
a low mean relative to its standard deviation is intuitively likely to have more turning
points. We formally examine the spectral density of the series in Section 4.
12We examined the order of integration of the variables using Augmented Dickey-Fuller,
Phillips-Perron and SimsBayesian tests. We conclude on the basis of these tests that the
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signicance of the tie-up across interest rates and through all sub-periods
provides some evidence in favour of some common determinant of the price
and interest rate process in the UK dataset.
In conclusion, we nd evidence to suggest that there is a positive
relationship between the level of interest rates and the log-level of prices.
The association is positive and seems closely related to the long run, or
trend, movements in prices and interest rates. In the UK, this means that
the association results from the downswing in prices and interest rates in
the rst half of the eighteenth century, from the long upswing in interest
rates and prices of the latter-half of the eighteenth century and the long
downswing that characterised the (long) nineteenth century. Finally, the
association is found to be essentially persistent throughout the business
cycle. The next section examines some of the reasons suggested for this
association.
3 The Paradoxes of the Gibson Paradox
3.1 A discussion of Wicksell and Keynes
As stated in the introduction the Gibson Paradox was so named by Keynes
(1930): Gibson had observed a close correlation between the interest rate
and the price level over a period of over a hundred years and Coates (pp200-
201 op. cit. Keynes, 1930) conrmed these results for the period 1825-1924
and 1908-1924. The relationship was noted and rationalised by Wicksell
(1907) and by Hawtrey (1927). We shall consider Wicksells and Keynes
explanations for the paradox in some detail. This is not only because of their
historical interest. In contrast to many of the more recent explanations, both
explained the relationship in terms of a general macroeconomic model.
In our discussion of the paradox and to facilitate comparisons with
previous explanation it will be useful to reintroduce into the discussion the
Wicksellian distinction, also used by Keynes, between the natural rate of
possibility of stationarity in levels for at least one of the tests cannot be ruled out.
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interest, the real rate of interest and the market (or, equivalently, loan)
rate of interest. According to both Keynes and Wicksell the natural rate
of interest is that rate at which saving equal investment, or alternatively
that rate at which aggregate demand is equal to aggregate supply. The only
modication we wish to make to this denition, to be able to incorporate
more recent versions of macro models which distinguish between a short run
upward sloping supply curve and a long run inelastic supply curve, is to
add to the denition that it is that interest rate at which saving is equal
to investment in long run equilibrium. The interest rate at which saving is
equal to investment, but not necessarily in long run equilibrium is the real
rate. And the market rate is the real rate plus anticipated ination - the
Fisherian distinction.
Why did Wicksell and Keynes consider Gibsons observation to be a
paradox? Wicksell was concerned with the question of how prices could be
controlled by the banking system. In his analysis he considers a situation in
which banks set the interest rate and supply the amount of money that is
demanded, a situation in which demand and supply of money have become
about the same thing, the demand to a large extent creating its own supply.
(p.215) If the interest rate is set below (above) the existing rate of prot, or
as Wicksell called it the natural rate of interest, prices rise (fall) because
of the ensuing excess demand (supply) in the commodity market. Wicksell
tells us that the proposition that a low rate of interest will raise prices
and a high rate will lower prices has been stated more than once, but
a formidable objection was always triumphantly brought against it in the
shape of statistical facts: high prices do not correspond with a low rate
of interest, and, vice versa; it rather comes the opposite way, interest and
prices often rising and falling together.(p.216) So Wicksell had to reconcile
his theory that a low (high) rate of interest leads to rising (falling) prices
and the observation that prices and interest rates move together.
He did so by arguing that The rate of interest is never high or low in
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itself but only in relation to the prot which people can make...and this of
course varies. In good times, when trade is brisk, the rate of prot is high,
and, what is of great consequence, is generally expected to remain high; in
periods of depression it is low, and expected to be low. The rate of interest
on money follows, no doubt, the same course, but not at once, not of itself;
it is, as it were, dragged after the rate of prot by the movement of prices
and the consequent changes in the state of bank reserves, caused by the
di¤erence between the two rates(p.217). Bank reserves change because as
prices rise (fall) the demand for money rises (falls), the supply of money
follows, changing the reserve ratio of the banking establishment.
The solution to the Gibson paradox given by Keynes was to consider the
transition from one equilibrium state to another. There are various elements
to Keynes explanation of the Gibson Paradox. The rst element is the
e¤ect of increases in the capital stock on the natural rate. He argues that
the movements in the natural rate are long period movements extending
over decadesbecause the annual increment in any year to the aggregate
of capital is small relative to this aggregate... (p.182). The change in
the capital stock a¤ects the marginal e¢ ciency of capital or the prot rate,
resulting in a shift of the investment function. This is Keynes before The
General Theory, where changes in investment depend more on animal spirits
than on the stock of capital. These changes in investment imply changes to
the natural rate of interest. To re-equilibrate the commodity market, the
real rate of interest has to change so as to be equal to the new natural rate.
However, the real rate, as measured by the yield on consols, is sticky. There
is thus an excess supply or demand in the commodity market and prices
change. As prices change the real rate starts catching up with the natural
rate until we reach equilibrium. The explanation for the stickiness in the
real rate given by Keynes is that in London bank lending is not conducted
wholly on the principles of a free market... (p.182.). Presumably because
of this market any excess demand or supply of loans does not a¤ect the
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interest rate in the short run and we observe quantity adjustments in bank
lending rather than price adjustments.
Keynesconsiders a possible objection to his explanation, namely, that
over longish periods the price level is governed by the supply of money...
and this is governed by causes quite independent of the rate of interest.
(p.183) It is clear from the context that what Keynes has in mind is that
increases in the supply of gold and silver that have occurred over the period
he was considering. His response is that the degree of managementwhich
has existed during the past hundred years, aimed at adjusting the supply
of money to the status quo, is commonly under-estimated. In fact, central
banks have shown themselves much more adaptable to changes in the supply
of gold, relative to the demand for it, than is sometimes supposed. They are
all natural gold hoarders, and are always keen to increase their stocks of it
whenever they nd themselves in a position to do so without inconveniencing
the business world; so the abundant supplies of gold can often be absorbed
without producing as much e¤ect on prices as might have been expected.
On the other hand when gold is in short supply, they are reluctant to put
strong pressure on the business world...they will nd some way, e.g. by
slowly modifying their reserve practices or the use of gold in circulation, of
making a smaller quantity of gold doas well as a larger would have with
their old habits and practices. (p.184)
Besides the long period e¤ects of the increase in the capital stock on
the natural rate, Keynes also considers short period disruptions. During
the Napoleonic Wars, during the Boer War and during the great expansion
of foreign investment which followed it (1901-1914), and during the Great
War, the rate of interest did not rise fast enough to keep saving level with
investment (p. 185). Similarly, Wicksell writes (1898b, p. 86) the long
wars unquestionably entailed a tremendous sacrice of liquid capital just at
the time when this was being made use of by production to an ever larger
extent. The natural rate of interest on capital must therefore have been very
13
high throughout this period.
This long term explanation implies that as the capital stock increases
over time the aggregate supply curve shifts to the right requiring a lower
natural rate to equilibrate the commodity market. The excess supply of
commodities results in a fall in prices. We can follow Keynes (1930) and
assume that the market rate of interest adjusts slowly to the natural rate.
However, we would also observe the same relationship between prices and
the interest rate if, following Keynes (1936) the interest rate equilibrates
the money market and the quantity of nominal money is xed. The fall in
prices results in an increase in the real quantity of money and a fall in the
interest rate. The ware¤ect merely introduces autonomous expenditure
and a higher natural rate. Prices rise because of the excess demand for
commodities, and the market rate of interest adjusts slowly to the natural
rate.
Keynes explanation for the long-term movements of prices and the
interest rate is reasonably consistent with the data he considered, from
about 1795 - 1928. However, it is more problematic when considering the
18th century. Between about 1750 and 1800 prices and the interest rate
were both rising. Though the capital stock and output may not have been
rising by as much as during the 19th century, they were surely not falling,
which is what would be required for a symmetrical explanation of the long
term trend. One may be able to reconcile the data from this period by
combining Keynes long term and his war explanation. These work in
opposite directions.
Though there are major similarities between Wicksells and Keynes
explanation for the Gibson paradox, there are two substantial di¤erences.
According to Wicksell the crucial link between prices and interest rates
operates via bank reserves. Changes in these above (below) the desired
level induce the changes in the market interest rate. Consider the situation
after a rise in the natural rate due to a change in the prot rate. Prices
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start rising because of the excess demand for commodities, the demand for
nominal money starts rising and so bank reserves start falling and the banks
start raising the market rate. When the market rate reaches the new natural
rate, prices stop rising. At this point bank reserves are still lower than they
were at the beginning of the process. They are no longer falling but their
level is lower than before. If banks do have a desired reserve ratio they will
now raise the market rate above the natural rate. Prices will start falling
and now reserves will start rising back towards the original level. When they
reach that level banks may reduce the interest rate towards the natural rate.
There is overshooting of the market rate relative to the natural rate. This
would not occur in Keynesstory. According to him banks can live happily
with a wide range of reserves and can easily adjust to changes in reserves.
The second major di¤erence between Keynes and Wicksell concerns the
e¤ects of an increase in gold, for example, because of a new discovery. The
implication of Wicksells theory is that such increases result in a decline
in the market rate of interest because bank reserves would rise above their
desired level. With the natural rate unchanged, prices would start rising, the
reserve ratio would start falling and the market rate would start adjusting
back to the natural rate. In Keynestheory this would not happen as the
new gold would be swallowed by the natural gold hoardersand would not
result in a fall in the market rate of interest.13
3.2 Wicksells theory
Wicksell developed his theory of the relationship between the natural and
the money rate of interest in response to the criticisms levied against the
quantity theory by people like Tooke and Mill. (1898b, pp68-71). Many of
these criticisms were based on the observation that most transactions were
13To some extent, as the Bank of England is thought to have operated with relatively
low gold reserves the discount rate may have been more susceptible to changes but to the
extent that there were gold hoarders there would have been some mitgation of this e¤ect
We are grateful for a referee for bringing this point to our attention.
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carried out with bank credit and other kinds of credit rather than money.
These various credit theories of prices rejected the notion that the quantity
of money was of any importance. Wicksell developed his model to cope
with both a monetary system in which actual money was used, a pure cash
economy, and one in which actual money had been displaced by book entries
in banks, a pure credit economy(1898b, p.75). The similarity between the
two is in the transmission mechanism.
According to Wicksell changes in the quantity of money a¤ect prices by
rst reducing the money interest rate and introducing a discrepancy between
it and the real rate, or natural rate. It is this discrepancy that introduces
disequilibrium in the commodities market between aggregate demand and
supply and results in a change in prices. Similarly in a pure credit economy
a change in the natural rate of interest, which according to Wicksell was
highly variable, introduces a discrepancy between it and the bank interest
rate and prices start changing. Prices will continue changing as long as
banks maintain their interest rate below (above) the natural interest rate.
In Wicksells pure credit economy there seems to be no economic
reasons for the banks to change their interest rate in response to the rising
(falling) prices generated by the discrepancy between the money and the
natural rate. In this system banks do not hold cash reserves of any sort.
However Wicksells system and analysis can be easily formalised in a system
in which banks hold some reserves in the form of cash. In such a system as
we shall see the relationship between prices and interest rates - the Gibson
Paradox - becomes more apparent.
3.3 A formal treatment
In this section, we present a formal exposition of the model presented in the
previous section. Here a (mono)bank targets an optimal reserve ratio and
any di¤erences between the natural rate of interest and the rate charged
by banks for loans produces disequilibrium in the market for loans. This
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disequilibrium results in changes in the aggregate price level and a deviation
in the reserve ratio from its optimum. The bank tends to move its loan
rate to equal that of the (unobservable) naturalrate through a process of
inspection and iteration and until the nominal quantity of loans is backed
by a quantity of commodity money such that the optimal reserve ratio is
obtained.
We rst model the banking sector. Banks set interest rates so as to
maximise prots, , subject to the risk of non-convertibility, , or strictly
speaking the risk of losing (gold) convertibility. Banks have the following
mean-variance utility function:
U = U (; ) : (1)
Banks face a demand for loans expressed in real terms that depends on
the interest rate for loanable funds (market interest rate), say, L (r) with
.L0 (:)  0 The demand for loans is specied in real terms because loans are
used to purchase units of investment (or consumption). Banks have costs
that we shall assume are some varying percentage of loans, as so:
 = rL (r)  cL (r) : (2)
The risk of non-convertibility is measured by an inverse function of the
reserve ratio, say:
 = 

PL (r)
G

; 0 ()  0 (3)
The reserve ratio, R, is the inverse of the term in parentheses on the
r.h.s. of (3), and we dene it as the ratio of the value of gold in reserves, G,
to the nominal quantity of loans outstanding, PL (r).. We shall maintain
this formulation throughout the rest of this paper. From (1), (2) and (3),
U =

+
 (r);
 
 (r)

(4)
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dU
dr
= u1
0 (r)  u20 (r) = 0; and so (5)
u1
u2
=
0 (r)
0 (r)
: (6)
From (3) and (2) we can write
0 (r) =
0PL0 (r)
G
(7)
0 (r) = (r   c)L0 (r) + L (r) : (8)
And using (6), (7) and (8)
u1
u2
=

0PL0 (r)
G [(r   c)L0 (r) + L (r)]

: (9)
This condition states that the bank will set its market interest rate so
that the marginal risk of non-convertibility (the numerator of the r.h.s. of
(9)) equals the marginal prots from the loan book (the denominator). We
can illustrate the equilibrium in Figure 4. In the North-East quadrant we
show a prot curve in   space which is maximised at C: At that point risk
of non-convertibility is relatively high, as  is high and the market interest
rate, r0 is low relative to the natural rate of interest, r^: In the same quadrant
we show the indi¤erence curve representing utility function (1). Note that
at A:  = 0; and implies a 100% reserve ratio where G=PL (r) = 1 and
 = (r   c)G. The South-West quadrant shows the trade-o¤ between risk
and return (9) faced by the bank and the North-West quadrant represents
equation (2). The prot level obtained at B represents the preferred point
of trade-o¤ between risk and return. If banks choose an interest that is
below (above) the optimal point, r^, prices will start to rise (fall), the reserve
ratio fall (rise) - and eventually equilibrium obtains under r^: Note two points
about the naturalrate: (i) it is unobservable and banks will arrive at it only
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thorough a gradual process of iteration by observing important movements
in their reserve ratios and (ii) it is exogenous and movements in its level will
produce qualitatively similar e¤ects.
Figure 4: Bank Reserves, Risk and the Natural Rate
We move on to analyse the macroeconomic implications of the
adjustment process for prices and interest rates. Let:
t =
eP
P 
(10)
represent the equilibrium relative prices of home and foreign prices
(asterisk). Under convertibility, e is xed and so we normalise to 1. So
that when P 6= tP  domestic bank reserves will change. Thus:
dR
dt
=  (tP    P ) ;   0; (11)
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dP
dt
= 

trt   r^

;   0; (12)
dr
dt
= 

dR
dt

=  (tP    P ) ;   0: (13)
From (12)
d2P
dt2
= 
dr
dt
=  (tP    P ) : (14)
Now let z =  and so we have
d2P
dt2
+ zPt   ztP  = 0: (15)
Hence the price level will adjust (cycle) to that level implied by (10)
and in the process of adjustment interest rates will converge on the natural
interest rate and the reserve ratio will tend to its optimal level. Note that
because the price level must return to its original level, tP , and so interest
rates will have to not only to move to the naturalrate for a period overshoot
their equilibrium in order to bring the price level back to its initial level.
The comparative statics are:
Case 1 Natural rate shifts
The market rates moves gradually up (down) to the natural rate.
During which time loan disequilibrium leads to excess investment (saving)
and increases (decreases) in the aggregate price level. Prices cease to move
when the loan rate equals the naturalrate but because the reserve ratio
is below (above) its optimal level, loan rates will temporarily overshoot
the equilibrium so that prices fall (increase) to their original level. Here
prices and market rates will be positively associated at the lower end of the
frequency spectrum.
Case 2 Gold shock
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A positive (negative) gold shock will reduce (increase) the reserve ratio
and lead to an expansion (contraction) of the nominal loan portfolio. This
implies that market interest rates will temporarily fall (rise) and the price
level will rise (fall) permanently to a new level. Here prices and market rates
will be positively associated at in the nal part of the adjustment of interest
rates back to the natural rate: that is at higher frequencies.
Case 3 Change in equilibrium relative price
Lower (higher) domestic prices than equilibrium imply excess domestic
demand and domestic prices must adjust to the higher (lower) foreign price
level. As there can be no change in the reserve ratio the quantity of loans
must fall (rise) and this is instituted by a temporary increase in the market
rate. Here prices and market rates will be positively associated in the rst
part of the adjustment of interest rates away from the natural rate: that is
at higher frequencies.
4 Empirical Tests
The model developed in Section 3 allow us to consider a tests of the
relationships between interest rates, prices and the reserve ratio. We use
spectral analysis so we can decompose the variance in each time series
into cycles corresponding to di¤erent frequencies running from the lowest
frequency - the time span of the data - to the highest - in this case annual.
One we obtain the spectral density of each series we can calculate the co-
spectra.
4.1 A Spectral Test
We can dene the cross-spectrum between two series as:
$12 () =
1P
s= 1
(12)se
is; (16)
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with the corresponding integrated spectral function W (a) dened over
the range 0 to . Solving for the cross correlation we nd that
(12)s =
1

R
 
$12 () e
 is: (17)
In a univariate setting the sin terms cancel as k =  k and the spectral
density is real. But now we have:
$12 () = 1 +
1P
s=1
n
(12)s cos s+ (12) s cos s
o
+i
1P
s=1
n
(12)s sin s+ (12) s sin s
o
: (18)
From (18) we can see that the cross-spectra has an imaginary and real
component. The rst two terms on the right hand side, c (), are the co-
spectra and the nal term, q (), is the spectral density. The sum of the
squares of these two terms is the amplitude, which when standardised by
the spectral densities of each separate series, $i (), is called the coherence:
C () =
c2 () + q2 ()
$1 ()$2 ()
: (19)
The coherence measures the degree to which the series vary together and
can be thought of as the squared correlation coe¢ cient. The gain diagram
plots ordinate R212 () against  as abscissa, where
R212 () =
$1 ()
$2 ()
C () : (20)
The gain is analogous to a regression coe¢ cient. Finally, the phase
diagram plots  () as against  as abscissa, with the phase measuring the
lead or lag in the relationship at each frequency:
 () = arctan
q ()
c ()
: (21)
Figures 5-7 show the (i) coherence is the squared correlation coe¢ cient
at each frequency, (ii) the gain and (iii) the phase as a fraction of the cycle by
22
which one series leads (lags) the other for prices and interest rates and then
each against the targetvariable in a partial-reserve commodity standard:
the optimalreserve ratio.14 Figure 5 suggests clear coherence at the trend
frequency between interest rates and prices and at the higher frequency end
of the business cycle: about 18 months. The gain statistic is most powerful
at the high business cycle frequency and suggests the existence of a short
cycle relationship between interest rates and prices. But note that at these
signicant horizons the relationship is essentially unlagged and therefore
likely to be related to some common shock - natural rate shocks for the
low frequency coherence and gold and foreign price shocks for the higher
frequency coherence.
What is the connection between interest rates and prices and our
measured reserve ratio?15 Figure 6 nds nd important coherences at the
trend and longer business cycle frequencies (2-3 years) and note that the gain
is highest at the trend. We also nd that prices lag the reserve ratio quite
prominently. Figure 7 paints a very similar picture in terms of coherences
and gain between interest rates and the reserve ratio, with peaks at ve
years, two years and one year, but nds at the lower frequency peak that
interest rates lag the reserve ratio and at higher frequency peaks leads the
reserve ratio. We interpret these results as providing corroboration of the
importance of longer run movements in the interest rates and prices as
resulting from deviations of the reserve ratio from its desired level. But
that the important switch at shorter horizons provides some evidence for
the role also played by shorter run adjustment to gold shocks and foreign
14The spectrum decomposes the time series into its constituent cycles from the lowest
(212 years, rst vertical line) to the highest frequency of the data (one-year, third vertical
line). Note that the middle vertical line corresponds to a frequency of two years. The
coherence is bounded between 0 and 1 and signicance is tested by test statistic distributed
as F (2,2(n-1)), which for this data size suggests coherence over 0.4 is signicant (see
Koopmans (1995)).
15Until 1844 (inclusive) the reserve ratio
is calculated as: notes in circulation+ deposits+7day and other bills
coins and bullion
and from 1845 the reserve
ratio is calculated as deposits+7day and other bills
notes in bank+ bullion in bank department
.
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price level disturbances in explaining the paradox.
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Figure 5: The Price Level and the Consol Rate
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Figure 6: The Price Level and the Reserve Ratio
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Figure 7: The Consol Rate and the Reserve Ratio
4.2 A Time Series Test
We investigate the issue a little further with the help of an identied vector
autoregression (VAR). Following Koop et al (1996) we estimate generalised
impulse response functions within the context of a multivariate time series
model. We use a generalised identication rather than orthogonal because
over the course of a year, our frequency of measurement, we do not think
that it makes sense to think about which variable leads which other. The
generalised function allows us to think about the response of a variable to a
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generalised residual in the any of the VARs equations.
zt = a0 +
pP
i=1
izt i + 	wt + ut; t = 1; 2; : : : ; n: (22)
where zt is an m  1 vector of jointly determined dependent variables,
wt is a q1 vector of exogenous variables and them1 vector of disturbances
satisfy standard criteria. Given that the VAR is stable, all the roots of the
determinantal equation will lie outside the unit circle, the moving average
representation of (23) can be employed:
zt =
1X
j=0
Ajut j +
1X
j=0
Bjwt j ; (23)
where matrices, Aj and Bj , are computed recursively. The generalised
impulse response function for a system-wide shock, u0t , is dened by:
GIz
 
N;u0t ;

0
t 1

= E (zt+N jut)  E
 
zt+N j
0t 1

(24)
where E (:j:) is the mathematical conditional expectation with respect
to the VAR model and 
0t 1 is the realisation of the process at time t   1.
And when the VAR has a moving average representation we have:
GIz
 
N;u0t ;

0
t 1

= ANu
0
t  N
 
0;AN
P
A0N

(25)
For a given set of exogenous variables, if the VAR model is perturbed
by a shock, i = 2
p
ii, to the ith equation at time t. The denition of the
generalised impulse response allows us to write:
GIij;N =
e0jAN
P
ej
2
p
ii
; i; j = 1; 2; : : : ;m; (26)
where e is them1 selection vector and the generalised impulse response
function of a unit shock to the ith equation in the VAR on the jth variable
at horizon N is given by the jth element.
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses (years) to a unit shock in the Reserve Ratio
Figure 8 plots the response of the reserve ratio, consol rate and the price
level to unit shock to the equation for the reserve ratio. The pattern of
impulse response functions broadly corroborates the results in the previous
section, 4.1 - the consol rate and price level move in an opposite direction
to the reserve ratio and equilibration is measured in decades. When the
reserve ratio is temporarily shocked into surplus the market rate slowly falls
as does the price level over a period of four years. The consol rate then
starts to return slowly to the long run level, equivalent to the unobserved
natural rate, the half-life of which is a further eleven years. The price
level shows evidence of cycling slowly back to its long run level.16 One nal
16The correlation between the impulse response paths is 0.55 between the consol rate
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point the reserve ratio shows considerably less persistence than the other two
variables but seems closely (and inversely) related to the long run pattern of
uctuations in the consol rate and the price level.17 Given there are several
regime changes and temporary, yet persistent shocks, induced by war - the
most prominent example being the suspension of convertibility in 1797 -
we may consider it necessary to model these events as well but the overall
statistical properties of the VAR do not suggest the need for sub-sampling
and so tentatively, at least we do think these results are at least consistent
with the Wicksellian version of events.18
5 Concluding Remarks
Over the two hundred years for which we have data, the British economy
has been subjected to a whole variety of shocks: wars and famines, gold and
silver discoveries, changes in monetary regimes, the industrial revolution and
many others (see Crafts, 1985). Yet over this whole period the relationship
between interest rates and prices, the Gibson Paradox, seems to have
persisted. As Keynes put it It is very unlikely indeed that it can be
fortuitous, and it ought, therefore, to be susceptible of some explanation of
a general character. (1930, p.179). Explanations o¤ered include causality
running from prices to interest rates via wealth e¤ects (Shiller and Siegel,
1977), or from interest rate to prices via excess supply of money (Barsky
and Summers (1988)).
Over this period wealth was changing for all sorts of reasons: there was
growth of capital, population changes and the discovery of new technologies.
It seems likely that the wealth e¤ects arising from an unanticipated rise in
and price level and -0.39 and -0.29 between the reserve ratio and consol rate and the price
level, respectively.
17Qualitatively similar results are available for the sets of short run rates. We ran a
fourth order VAR having tested for lag length using Akaike information criteria, sequential
log likelihood and the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion. We are able to reject at the 5% that
each of the three variables do not block Granger cause the other two variables. Full test
results are available on request.
18We plan to study the suspension of convertibility period in future work.
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prices might be swamped by the real changes occurring over this period.
Similarly, the excess supply of money over this period would be a¤ected
on the supply side by gold and silver discoveries and changes in monetary
regimes and on the demand side by changes in real income. Any interest rate
e¤ect on gold hoards and on the demand for money would be second order its
e¤ects would be unlikely to dominate everything else. If our stylised fact is
right then, as conceded by Friedman and Schwartz then, all that is required
is that real disturbances that tend to raise nominal rates should also tend
to raise prices; and real disturbances that tend to raise prices should also
tend to raise interest rates (p565).
What we nd likely, prompted by Wicksell and Keynes, is that the
need to maintain commodity convertibility lay at the heart of the Gibson
paradox. The banking sector needed to maintain a given reserve ratio
but, in the face of both persistent and temporary shocks to the economys
natural rate, would only gradually move the market interest rates to
levels where neither prices nor the reserve ratio would then move. The
insight of Wicksell, and to an extent Keynes, was to realise that in
a monetary economy, real disturbances were more than likely to have
signicant monetary consequences - it is an insight that has arguably not
yet been fully appreciated.
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ANNEX 1: DATA SOURCES
A1: Price Indices
The main source publications for the Wholesale Prices Index series are:
Mitchell B.R. (1988) "British Historical Statistics" Cambridge University
Press; Mitchell B.R. (1998) "International Historical Statistics: Europe
1750-1993", McMillan Reference Limited; US Bureau of Census (1960)
"Historical Statistics of the United States (Colonial Times to 1957)", US
Government Printing O¢ ce; "The Statistical Abstract of United States.
The national data book", US Government Printing O¢ ce, various years;
"Estadisticas Historicas de Espana: Siglos XIX y XX", Fundación Banco
Exterior, 1989.
France [Period 1798-1993]; Germany [Period 1792-1993]; Italy [Period
1861-1993]; Sweden [Period 1860-1993] all from B R Mitchell (1998).
Spain WPI. [Period 1812-1954] are from Estadisticas Historicas (1989)
pp. 518 and 521-522.
UK [Period 1727-1980] are from B R Mitchell (1988) Chapter XVI.
US [Period 1749-1951] are from "Historical Statistics of the United
States", pp. 210-11 and [Period 1926-1988] from "The Statistics Abstract
of United States", various years.
A2: Interest Rates
The main source publications for the Interest Rate series are
Homer, S. (1963) "A History of Interest Rates" Rutgers University
Press; Bordo, M D and Rocko¤, H (1996) "The Gold Standard as a "Good
Housekeeping Seal" of Approval", Journal of Economic History, 56(2), June,
pp. 389-428.
France: Long-term interest rates (annual average) from (Homer, pp. 222-
223) with 5% Rents [Government Securities]. Period 1800-1852 and 3%
Rents [Government Securities]. Period 1853-1961. Short-term interest rates
(annual average) (Homer, pp. 230-231 and 435-436) and Discount Rate of
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Bank of France. Period 1800-1961.
German: Long-term interest rates (annual average) from (Homer, pp.
259-260 and 461-462) and Prussian State 4s Yields. Period 1815-1883,
Imperial German 4s Yields. Period 1884-1908, High-Grade Bond Yields.
Period 1900-1962 and Short-term interest rates (annual average) from
(Homer, pp. 264-266 and 467-468). Minimum Rate of Discount of
Reichsbank. Period 1817-1900 and O¢ cial Discount Rate. Period 1900-
1962.
Italy: Long-term interest rates (annual average) (Bordo) Period 1870-
1920.
Spain: Long-term interest rates (annual average) (Bordo) Period 1883-
1914.
Sweden: Long-term interest rates (annual average) (Homer, pp. 272 and
476-477) and Long-term E¤ective Rate of State Bonds. Period 1855-1954.
Short-term interest rates (annual average)
(Homer, pp. 272 and 476-477) and Discount Rates of Bank of Sweden.
Period 1854-1962.
UK: Long-term interest rates (annual average) (Homer, pp. 161-162),
Old 3% Annuities [Government Securities]. Period 1729-1752, 3% Consols
[Government Securities]. Period 1753-1899.
(Homer, pp. 409-410), 2.5% Consols [Government Securities]. Period
1900-1961.
US: Long-term interest rates (annual average) (Homer, pp. 286-
287), High-Grade Railway Bond Yields. Period 1857-1937, New England
Municipal Bonds Yields. Period 1798-1900; Federal Government Bond
Yields. Period 1790-1832 and Bordo. Period 1870-1914. Short-term
interest rates (annual average) from Bordo. Period 1870-1914 and Short-
term interest rates (annual average) (Mitchell, pp. 683) and 3 month bank
bill. Period 1824-1991.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of UK Prices and Interest rates 1702-1913
Mean St Dev Mean/StDev Skewness Kurtosis
Price Level 3.507** 0.936 3.747 1.037** 0.910**
Consol Rates 3.739** 1.067 3.504 1.900** 4.868**
Discount Rate
on Prime Bank
Bills
3.619** 1.274 2.841 0.270 -0.382
Bank Rate 4.029** 1.040 3.874 0.334 0.254
Exchequer
Bills
3.748** 1.571 2.386 2.037** 4.698**
Reserve Ratio 0.371** 0.149 2.490 -0.085 -0.680*
Notes:  (a) we use log-level for prices and levels for interest rates; b) * and ** indicates significant
difference from zero at 5% and 1% respectively; c) Discount on prime bank bill series is from 1800, the
Bank rate from 1797 and the Exchequer Bill series until 1856.
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